In a recent review for The New York Review of Books, IIHA Alumna Annie Sparrow (MHCE 4) responds to Sonia Shah’s book Pandemic: Tracking Contagions, from Cholera to Ebola and Beyond.
Monthly Archives: June 2016
Abdullah Zaman (IDHA 47) recently delivered a lecture on “humanitarian logistics” to the Disaster Management and Supply Chain graduates at one of the leading universities in Pakistan.
Those of you at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) who were brave (or lucky) enough to make your way from the plenary building to the side events area, and through a maze of tunnels to the Exhibition Fair to then defy four flights of stairs up to the Innovation Marketplace, may probably have already met me. As Humanitarian Innovation Fellow at the IIHA and Manager of the High Tech Humanitarians project, I had the pleasure and privilege to participate in the WHS in Istanbul last week to present our activities and take part in the launch of the Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation (GAHI), of which IIHA is a founding member.
Many well-qualified and well-credentialed attendees have already produced a broad spectrum of opinions on the takeaways from the WHS. Their conclusions range from the downright critical, to the relieved, to the mildly enthusiastic, but there are still a few conclusions worth noting.
War, more so than the G7, was the biggest absence at the WHS.
Apart from a few blessed events dedicated to specific categories of vulnerable populations, the theme ‘protection of civilians in times of armed conflict’ was barely visible in the overall agenda. Discussions in this sense remained vague, and were mostly limited to recalling what is already well rooted in international law. Considering that around 80 percent of the humanitarian crises are due to conflicts, this basically means that for two days the humanitarian community discussed how to improve about 20 percent of its work.
Some could object that I’m being provocative – that, even without explicit mention of “times of armed conflict,” assistance as discussed also applies to situations of armed conflict – and they would be right. However, the reality is that some of the key measures finalized at the WHS as final global commitments to reform humanitarian assistance often do not apply in times of violence.
This is the case, for example, for cash programming and localisation. In times of conflict, the localisation of humanitarian assistance would be far from easy. Even those local NGOs who are not impeded from receiving international funds and grants for having ties with an armed or political faction very rarely have the capacity to absorb, manage, use and report on funds that, in order to be effective, easily reach the five to six digit range.
This is of course not the fault of local actors. As noted in a recent report, funding strategies are often the main threat to humanitarian neutrality, impartiality and independence, as donors discourage programming in opposition-held territories, or in areas out of government control, leading to a de facto politicization of humanitarian response.
Refusing to fund overheads to local NGOs, donors can potentially curtail the sustainability of programs and undermine future development. This is especially true considering that in situations of armed conflict, local capacity is put under considerable strain as organizations and their staff try to face a dangerous crisis while having to balance their altruism with the need to ensure their own safety and that of their families.
While the WHS closed with a commitment for less paperwork and bureaucracy and more direct access to funding, these issues were not addressed in any concrete way, and the feeling is that donors will continue deciding on a case-by-case basis, mostly according to their own existing regulations and agendas.
Finally, it is broadly agreed that the attention-grabbing figure of only 0.2 to 1.6 percent of humanitarian aid going directly to local groups is misleading, to say the least. There is a reason why we constantly praise the role of local actors, and lament the shrinking access of international humanitarian agencies and INGOs: National NGOs deliver most of the assistance and thus manage a relevant part of the resources.
Humanitarian aid is much more than its monetary value. If it were just about the monetary value, then the humanitarian assistance decision-making process would be limited to fundraising, procurement and warehouse logistic phases. However, the networking, access, distribution and M&E processes are just as valuable as the rest: covering the last mile doesn’t necessarily mean being in a subsidiary position compared to those applying for grants.
Focusing on promoting partnership models that ensure increased participation of local partners in strategic humanitarian planning – and limiting the abused practice of sub-contracting – rather than enforcing arbitrary quotas in direct funding, could probably better ensure that INGOs and humanitarian agencies, with all their well-known bureaucracy and malfunctioning, will guarantee, monitor and protect their operations without bossing around local partners.
As for the massive switch to cash programming, humanitarians know better than anyone else that giving money to local actors and civilians who are on the front lines of widespread violence often means exposing them to increased risks, with little to zero hope for them to be able to use that money at all. According to some figures, offering people affected by crises cash instead of goods or services would be feasible in as many as 70 to 80 percent of all humanitarian contexts. The studies that I know of surely prove the need to increase the amount of cash transfers and assess their theoretical feasibility, but don’t perform a conflict-specific analysis to scientifically prove that the cash system is the best option in such an overwhelming amount of cases.
Very often where violence reigns, money has a much higher value for armed actors, who still have access to surviving markets, than it does for local populations. It is true that in some cases direct cash to households has shown a positive trend in decreasing involvement of civilians in hostilities, but further studies also prove an increase in the number of conflict-related casualties in the receiving community. Also, this system risks encroaching on the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, as it mainly relies on institutional channels which make it difficult or dangerous for communities in areas not under government control to receive the money. Another reason for concern is the fact that conflict crises are more and more protracted in time, with refugee camps existing for decades and violence erupting regularly for many years. There is a risk, which in some cases has already occurred, of humanitarians adopting a “shadow government” role delivering guaranteed minimum income-style aid – and eventually supporting non-cash assistance and related services – for unpredictable stretches of time.
These were among the reasons why, many years ago, cash programming in conflict areas was progressively abandoned in favor of other forms of assistance. This is also the reason why, now, figures for cash-based assistance are so low in humanitarian action: with 80 percent of current humanitarian crises being conflict situations, the use of cash is still extremely sensitive.
The move towards an increased use of cash-based solutions would be a wise one, especially considering that most of the emerging or low-resource economies are already pioneering forms of remote, digital or mobile payments for daily use, leapfrogging from traditional paper money to cryptocurrencies and paperless distributed systems. However, approaching this issue from the dogmatic perspective of imposing quotas to be fulfilled, means not only denying that the shortages of food and basic items as well as the collapse of market services and retail infrastructures are part of the common paradigm to most conflict contexts, but also that most of the current architecture of the humanitarian system is not yet prepared to deliver cash in the face of armed actors.
Rather than setting unattainable quotas to be reached in an arbitrary time-frame, it would be more feasible and realistic for the humanitarian community to commit to dedicating an appropriate amount of internal funds and resources to create global, measurable and standardized procedures to effectively use cash-based methods in war contexts, without increasing vulnerabilities or affecting local markets. A collective push to incorporate cash as a regular tool of response would also have the positive effect of shifting the language of cash transfers from “innovation” – a reference which almost allows cash interventions to remain in pilot phase or at a very small scale – to “standardization”, which would allow humanitarian actors, academic institutions and donors to evaluate the real impact of these measures in a transparent, comparative and evidence-based manner.
So, did the WHS get it all wrong? Was it a smokescreen with red herrings for outcomes?
Absolutely not, at least in my opinion. As I said recently in an interview with the International Peace Institute’s Global Observatory, the WHS did what had to be done, in the given conditions: the humanitarian system may not be broke nor broken, but it surely needs a thorough revision. At the Summit, the humanitarian actors completed a long-overdue first step moving from soul-searching to re-shaping.
Some new actors emerged (new to the international conference scene, not to the field), especially from regions not traditionally known for exporting INGOs, while established actors agreed on the re-definition of operational boundaries among national and international NGOs, and on the need to update and improve humanitarian strategies.
The Grand Bargain addresses most of these issues, and promises to clear the table from some of the absurd earmarking and funding restrictions faced by potential implementing actors. All this had to be done, and as a result, the humanitarian system emerges stronger from this display of (almost) unity.
Many chastised the absence of the most important states, fearing the lack of engagement and commitment could anticipate a gap in political positioning. This fear seems superfluous: Indeed, states’ lack of engagement is by itself a political move. Refusing to engage in discussions about a stronger commitment to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), first at the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and then at the WHS, the international political structure is detaching itself from the humanitarian consequences of its actions.
The message is clear: a stronger and modern humanitarian system is welcome, as long as it doesn’t interfere with military and tactical priorities. As long as it keeps out of the war business, and keeps focusing only on doing its best to solace the victims, all is in order. But this system is not sustainable, nor just. As it has been said, one of the few conclusions that attracted broad consensus is that humanitarian problems can’t be solved only by assisting people and throwing money at problems.
Whatever will come after the WHS (implementing and follow-up mechanisms were not announced, which raised even more skepticism), the humanitarian system must prove itself able to reach real unity and demand to bring conflicts (and their victims) back to the center of the discussion.
Providing direct support to local actors is impossible if they are either identified as partial, or barred from receiving funds for political reasons under the blanket pretext of very loose anti-corruption, anti-terrorism and anti-violent extremism blacklists. National organizations cannot effectively implement relief operations if their staff is forced to flee with the civilian population because of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and aid workers. Delivering cash is counterproductive and harmful if armed actors don’t respect the obligation to spare civilians and their belongings. The international NGOs and humanitarian agencies can and must reform their procedures to leave more space to local actors, but they all need an environment conducive to delivering and providing humanitarian assistance in order to operate together in harmony.
It has been said that for states, the alternative to respecting the rules of war is to pay the price. The humanitarian system still has the chance to rally and demand that the real final price isn’t paid by their staff and the civilian population. It is a good opportunity for the freshly motivated humanitarian world to cluster around the points proposed before and after the WHS, and lobby for a more positive discussions in the next international conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 2017. Everyone will gain from a stronger IHL, be they national or international actors.
PS: If you just discovered reading this post that what you thought was the Innovation Marketplace was actually the Exhibition Fair and that there was a whole world just above your head and you missed it, you’re not alone. Realizing the limbo we were stuck in, with the innovation crowd decided to turn to Twitter to voice our cry for attention and visibility.
Giulio Coppi has more than 8 years of humanitarian professional experience managing operations in South America, West and Central Africa, South and Central Asia. He earned his BA, MA and MAS in International Law with a specialization on Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in conflict. In his career, Giulio has cooperated with NGOs, Universities, the UN, the OECD and the ICRC. At the IIHA, Giulio oversees the Humanitarian Innovation program of the Institute, with a special focus on Open Source technology and community-based approaches, manages the joint initiative High Tech Humanitarians (HTH), and is IIHA’s focal point to the Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation launched during the WHS in Istanbul. To get in touch with him and contribute to the discussion, feel free to comment on this post or to email him at email@example.com. A big thanks goes to Kasia Laskowski for invaluable brain-picking, feedback and editing support.
Brendan Cahill (IDHA 9, IIHA Executive Director) recently provided insight on the Escalating Humanitarian Crises for Fordham’s 2016: Which Way are We Headed?
Have you read the IIHA’s Stories from the Field? In the latest featured piece, Mental Health in Complex Emergencies (MHCE) Course Director Lynne Jones shares with us the experience of her time in the migrant encampments in Greece.
Fordham University IIHA Humanitarian Innovation Fellow and High Tech Humanitarians Founder Giulio Coppi provides some insight on innovation discussions and outcomes at the World Humanitarian Summit in a recent interview with the International Peace Institute Global Observatory.
As the 48th International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA) approaches this Sunday, we share with you a brief of a lecture given on last year’s course by Patrick Walsh, Senior Adviser at SDSN.
After 18 months of international dialogue with experts from UN organizations, academia, civil society, business, and various national statistical offices, the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) headed by economist Jeffrey Sachs drafted its 2015 report. The report, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the Sustainable Development Goals, “outlines how a comprehensive indicator framework might be established to support the goals and targets proposed by the Open Working Group on [Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)].”
These goals encompass economic, social, and environmental policy fields and aim to provide a quantifiable framework for the construction and monitoring of local, national, regional, and global SDG progress. “We can’t isolate economic, social, and environmental policy anymore,” noted Patrick Walsh, Senior Adviser at SDSN. Walsh was leading IDHA’s afternoon lecture on the transition from crisis to development—where the need for humanitarian relief turns to that of nation building and sustainability. “Maybe in talking about that transition,” proposed Walsh, “we really see how to connect development to the humanitarian world.”
This connection, however, contains multiple points of resistance. The policy fields included in the report “have to be integrated both in the developing world and the developed world,” noted Walsh. But as the students quickly confirmed, such sustainable integration, not only between policy fields but also between international departments and organizations, often proves to be a difficult—and arguably unfeasible—partnership.
“Jeffrey Sachs’ answer to this is, of course, [that] development is what’s really important,” Walsh explained, “because if you don’t make progress in development, you’re just setting up crises of the future.” Ascribing financial primacy to crisis aid may provide temporary security solutions, but it fails to combat the very conditions from which future conflicts, and therefore future spending, will later arise—and will continue to arise—at the expense of the international community. Development becomes imperative, and Sachs “already thinks the resources are being wrongly allocated.”
Unfortunately, such challenges will not simply evaporate, nor can they be swept aside. In fact, successful progress with the sustainability goals outlined in the report hinges on resolving precisely these difficulties. Partnership is the fulcrum by which SDG progress is set into motion; progress is not made unless partnership is achieved. The “transformative ideas” brought to light by the report underscore this need for universality.
“Before we used to think of development as simply overseas development aid or foreign aid, where it’s the northern hemisphere donating to the southern hemisphere,” Walsh explained, “and that the southern hemisphere has to ‘catch up’ and work.” Environmental issues and climate change models radically challenge such assumptions and put pressure on the global community—though in terms of climate change, responsibility rests primarily with the northern hemisphere.
“But we fear it’s not just environmental issues,” Walsh admitted. “When people look at global value chains and industrial structures, there’s more and more of a realization with global finance and global trade—and even with global migration—that really the world has gotten much more interconnected.” The interconnectivity of global challenges calls for a holistic approach, despite the continued “polarization” of governmental departments and institutions. “We cannot in isolation look at security, in isolation look at social development, in isolation look at environment,” explained Walsh. Nor for that matter can these issues be solely the responsibility of governments. “Solutions have to be found where private sector, civil society, the government, and academia” intersect and where the incentives of each align.
“Households naturally [implement] sustainable approaches,” began Walsh, hoping to better explain the difficulty in aligning interests. “Any household I know, they focus a lot on children (they sacrifice a lot to put kids through school); […] the adults are investing in pension schemes and other things so that they will have security when they’re old; there is always a struggle around nutrition, so that when you’re young you eat properly so that you’ll be healthier when you’re older. This is what households are doing: they are all the time on the medium-long-term plan—always. When there’s a big financial shock, […] they delay fertility decisions; they take kids out of private schools; […] they don’t go on holiday. […] Whatever they have to do, they make that adjustment and that response to keep them on track to meet their long-term goals. Do we think governments do that? No. Do we think the private sector does that? Do we think NGOs do that? And this is the problem. This, to me, is the essence of [the question] of how do we somehow align the values and align all these groups and have a more medium-term, long-term perspective.”
“The vision here, under Jeffrey Sachs,” Walsh concluded, “was to start thinking about these types of partnerships and how they might deliver sustainable development goals.” For the UN, ‘sustainability’ entails the interaction between “three pillars:” economy, society, and environment. Walsh anticipated the audience’s concern: Oftentimes, “you might look at foreign direct investment and investment goals, and you might say, ‘that’s the evil of the world; their going in with their value chains to get the lowest cost labor, the lowest cost raw materials without much respect for the environment—the whole world is fused with these value chains and its very very destructive.’”
This assumption is certainly not unfounded. But “on the other hand,” countered Walsh, “you could look at industrial policy at a nation state where governments can have investment criteria.” Governments possess the capacity to dictate economic terms and set clear investment incentives. In theory, companies and corporations “should not really be trying to exploit gaps in societies and environments,” said Walsh; “all those gaps should be closed.” They should instead be incentivized to be on one level “mindful of human rights” and on another level “creating positive outcomes for societies and environments.”
This is of course the ideal, but as Walsh explained, such a project is not unattainable. Creating positive outcomes becomes a matter of creating “a demand for responsible investment.” The difficulty arises in the reconciliation of two key policy challenges: sustaining economic growth and tackling rising inequality. “The challenge of the Sustainable Development Project,” Walsh clarified, “is that we need to start thinking about new institutions, new ways of doing things, new policies that actually allow us to have economic prosperity but [those that generate] much more inclusive societies.”
Walsh drew the students’ attention to one particular working group goal outlined in the report—Goal 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” Indicators for attaining this include the reduction of violence, abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and arms flow, as well as the promotion of the rule of law and equal access to justice.
This goal, Walsh believed, falls most closely in line with the efforts of humanitarians on the ground. While it is certainly ambitious and perhaps lacking in the level of accountability or adequate “benchmarks” that many students believed requisite in assessing development, the goal, nevertheless, acts as a clear enunciation of sustainable objectives for the international community. One must consider the “developmental histories” of our own countries, Walsh explained. A state does not simply “jump” from one stage of development to the next; the process occurs slowly and often with the assistance of external players. “We have to build the nation state before the nation state can take responsibility,” Walsh concluded.
To better understand this development, it can be useful to run the process in reverse—understanding the factors that destabilize states and lead to collapse. “I wanted to try and get back to why a state fails,” explained Walsh, “and then—in terms of even your basic military and humanitarian intervention and what happens at ground zero—[ask] what sort of principles and what sort of things should really be happening in the humanitarian, the military, and the development interface.” What factors contribute to societal unrest and state instability, and how can the knowledge of these factors produce potential solutions for external organizations in constructing “development pathways from conflict”?
In his paper, Patterns of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region, Walsh analyzes the discrepancy between conflict developments across neighboring African states. The report juxtaposes two separate “zones”: zone 1—comprising Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—representing the “conflict” states, and its “counterweight,” zone 2—comprising Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia —representing the “peaceful states.” The goal, as outlined in the report, is to “identify a set of structural and historical factors (if any), that differentiate the zone 1 from the zone 2 states and which can explain the incidence of conflicts across time and countries.”
“What I’m searching for is a set of structural factors—a combination of things, whether they’re economic, social, or government structures—that makes you more vulnerable to conflict or less,” Walsh explained. By juxtaposing historical, economic, societal, and governmental developments, Walsh was searching for the underlying conditions that gave zone 1 a greater propensity for unrest. “The argument that I am going to make is that those who embraced development—particularly more openness in [their] society and their economies —and were less fractional (less [prone] to creating two separate groups) were the ones who came out the other side without conflict.”
Walsh noted some possible objections to his methodology. Some theorists maintain that every conflict is “idiosyncratic” and thus resistant to the kind of statistical analysis academics such as himself may hope to perform. If this idiosyncrasy were the case, however, analysis would reveal statistical uncertainties, and Walsh believed his findings told a much different story. Though the largest single indicator on the regression was precisely these “idiosyncratic effects by region and by conflict,” the indicator only accounted for about 40% of the variation, meaning there was a combination of separate, quantifiable factors contributing to zone 1’s propensity for conflict. (The fact that the idiosyncrasies was the largest single indicator means only that no other one factor could determine the variation between zones; it was thus a combination of historical, economic, societal, and governmental factors that contributed to this variation).
One of the most significant of such factors was colonial history. Colonization often lead to linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, destabilizing factors that later impacted social and economic development. The colonial power that had the most detrimental effect on states was Belgium. The Belgians used a particular type of strategy of indirect rule where they would “use and augment previous distinctions to define a local ruling elite.” This system proved the most destructive and “was a much bigger feature of Rwanda, Uganda, etc. that naturally had a north-south divide,” Walsh explained. Belgian rule acts a natural indicator of ethnic divide, but the Belgians were not the only force that perpetuated such divisions —Uganda, for instance, while belonging to zone 1, was not colonized by Belgium, but was rather divided due to its topography. What the Belgian indicator represents is rather the much greater destabilizing trend of ethnic divisions, perpetuated either by history or geography.
As the report concludes, “zone 1 states began the period of independence with serious vulnerabilities: particular forms of colonialism interlocked with ethnic divisions to produce conflict potential. However this was far from determining. It was the addition of other factors—military dictatorships, an isolation from the wider economy, and, particularly as violence developed, a hollowing out of the adult population and a destruction of civil society, that produced high conflict risk.” Likewise, countries in zone 2 though beginning their development trajectories on much more favorable historical conditions, nevertheless, required “subsequent choices and events, openness to international trade and aid, civilian dictatorships with strong integrative ideologies [(dictatorships indicated statistically greater levels of stability)], that permitted the building of cultural, political, and civil society barriers— [like an] immune system—against conflict.”
Though the conclusion produces no groundbreaking discoveries in the generation of conflict, it does provide a quantifiable explanation to compliment contemporary literature. It also helps to isolate developmental factors such as economic and political structures that may themselves help to “mitigate the initial conditions” of conflict —colonization, ethnic divisions, language, etc.
“When we go in with humanitarian action or we do capacity building, to build a state, build a colony, build a society,” explained Walsh, “we [should be] looking at how these economic or social indicators of development” may help in the intervention during times of conflict, and later, in the prevention of future conflicts. And in the end, the knowledge that prevention is critical and indeed possible becomes essential. “Those who are in the humanitarian world and the development world,” concluded Walsh, “have to believe that if we go into other countries, that we have to [contribute to a] change for good—that we’re pushing or nudging society, politics, and the economy in a direction that’s peaceful, that’s inclusive and responsible.” Otherwise, why go in at all?
Lecture given by Patrick Walsh, Senior Adviser at UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) to the IDHA 45 class at Fordham University, New York, June 2015
Brief written by Joshua Paul St. Clair, IIHA Summer 2015 Intern
Professor Patrick Walsh also gave a TED talk this past February 2016 focusing on the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and how it is an agenda of the people with the responsibility of implementation by the people. He delves into how people must use their influence over their livelihoods, civil society, and governance to create successful partnerships on local, national, and international levels.
The IIHA is proud to announce the graduation of Gianluigi Lopes (IDHA 37) from Fordham University’s Master’s in International Humanitarian Action (MIHA) Program!
Gianluigi, who began his career as a political scientist following his graduation from the University of Bologna in 2004, was employed for almost three years as freelance journalist and press officer for the private sector. He joined the humanitarian sector in 2008, and has since worked in countries including Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Holland, Italy, Iran, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malta, Mexico, Palestine, Sierra Leone, Sudan, South Africa, USA, Spain, and Switzerland. His work in humanitarian contexts has spanned the fields of communications, advocacy, training, logistics, information, and project management. A majority of his assignments have been linked to humanitarian medical interventions such as forced migration (Lampedusa, Malta, and detention centres for irregular migrants), displacement and conflict (Sudan), diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (South Africa, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Cambodia), and epidemics (Ebola in Western Africa, Cholera in Haiti and Sierra Leone).
In 2015, Gianluigi worked for the World Health Organization (OMS/WHO) in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone as regional information manager for the Ebola response, during which time he was seconded as health pillar coordinator in the cluster system at the National stadium of Freetown to support the flood response efforts. Prior to that, he was a senior communications adviser in several MSF headquarters (Brussels, Geneva, Amsterdam, Vienna, and Rome) and was part of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Ebola Task Force in Sierra Leone as an intersectional advocacy and liaison manager.
In his MIHA thesis, entitled “Embraced by the locals: Perception and acceptance of foreign aid,” Gianluigi examines the evolving impediments faced by international humanitarian agencies in their attempts to provide assistance to populations in need. He analyzes several typologies of the rejection of aid, provides possible causes of this phenomenon, and ultimately suggests that a perception gap characterizes the relations established among aid agencies and local actors within the operational contexts. Through this study, Gianluigi devises possible steps to be taken in order to improve the understanding of the contexts where aid efforts take place, and therefore diminish the misconceptions regarding the humanitarian discourse in emergency response.
Gianluigi is currently working for the Italian Red Cross as Head of Delegation in the Occupied Territories in Ramallah – Palestine and is in charge for the operations in the MENA area.
Congratulations Gianluigi! We wish you all the best in your future endeavors!
Aside from their humanitarian achievements, IIHA alumni possess a wide range of other talents, many of which venture into the realms of literature and the arts. One example is Terrence Ward (IDHA 12) who authored “The Guardian of Mercy: How an Extraordinary Painting by Caravaggio Changed an Ordinary Life Today,” which offers an incredible narrative journey into the heart of Caravaggio’s artistry and his metamorphosis from fugitive to visionary.